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Provision of quality tertiary education is an important determinant of economic growth and
development (Barro,1991; Aghion et al, 2005). Economists have also identiﬁed positive ex-
ternalities associated with tertiary education (Moretti, 2004; Ciccone and Perry, 2006). As
a result, there is a widespread concern over quality of tertiary education provision. Gov-
ernments in many developing countries directly provide tertiary education to make tertiary
education accessible to greater number of students, and to have better control over the qual-
ity of provision. Private providers are often criticized for inferior quality of provision, as it
is feared that they compromise the quality due to their market incentives to reduce costs.1
In many developing countries, public colleges are more prestigious, and their graduates have
better outcomes. While this is attributed to the value-added by the public colleges, little is
known about whether or not the public colleges actually add value.
Our paper aims to evaluate the diﬀerential impact of public colleges on students’ edu-
cational achievements in the context of India. The remarkable economic transformation of
India into a high-powered center of Information technology, which has been built on a large
pool of high-quality highly educated workers, suggests that the expansion of high quality
tertiary education is essential for the robust growth of India’s economy. While the govern-
ment wants to expand access, it also directly provides college education due to concerns over
quality erosion by private providers.
Entry into tertiary education in India is highly regulated.The University Grant Commis-
sion Act prohibits any institution from awarding degrees unless it is established under an
act of Parliament or is especially empowered to award degrees. A recent state reform that
allowed private universities to operate and provide tertiary education was overturned by
India’s Supreme Court in a decision that led to the de-recognition of 112 private universities
on quality grounds.2 This resonates with the state skepticism about market oriented ter-
tiary education sector to provide high quality tertiary education. One of the biggest policy
challenges is to decide how to expand access to tertiary education- by direct provision or
by contracting out to private providers and introducing need-and-merit based scholarships?
Public colleges in India, as in many developing countries, are perceived as more prestigious
and on the average, students graduating from public colleges in India have better educational
outcomes than their private counterparts.3 The public-private gap in educational outcomes
1Levy (2008,a and b) provide detailed discussion.
2The state of Chhattisgarh allowed the establishment of private universities under the Chhattisgarh
Private Sector University (Establishment & Regulation) Act, 2002. But the Supreme Court declared as null
and void the establishment of 112 private universities that emerged under this law. The decision is available
at http://www.ugc.ac.in/inside/supremecourt.pdf
3See (Powar and Bhalla, 2008) for example. This is true of other developing countries as well. Except for
1is often perceived as evidence for lower value-added by the private institutions, reﬂecting
their incentives to maximize proﬁts rather than improve quality. This makes a strong case
for increasing public college infrastructure through direct provision.
However, public colleges are highly subsidized for the sake of providing equitable access
to higher education. Therefore, the private-public educational outcome gap might reﬂect
the pre-determined quality of the students sorting into public colleges rather than the eﬀect
of the public college attendance on students’ outcomes. This paper aims to evaluate the
value-added of public tertiary education in India. Admission to public colleges in India is
based on the results of the Senior Secondary School examinations (the equivalent of high
school exit exams).4 Also, the exit exams taken at the undergraduate level are identical
(by ﬁeld of education and University of aﬃliation) across private and public colleges. We
take advantage of this to identify the value added of public colleges on students’ educational
outcomes using a Regression Discontinuity Design. We establish a unique data set that links
admission data reﬂecting students’ entry quality with their educational outcomes, measured
by the performance on the common exit exams. While passing these exams is required for
graduation, performance on these exit scores inﬂuences admission to graduate educational
programs, access to scholarships, and qualifying for most jobs.5 We ﬁnd that the exit scores
of the student’s graduating from public colleges are signiﬁcantly higher than those of their
private counterparts. However, once we account for self-selection into these colleges, using a
Regression Discontinuity Design framework, we ﬁnd that public colleges have no added value
at the margin. Controlling for entry scores, we ﬁnd no diﬀerences between the exit outcomes
of students graduating from public and private colleges. Since the admission cut-oﬀ varies
by year, gender, and stream of education, our data allows us to examine if public colleges
have a heterogenous eﬀect on educational outcomes. We ﬁnd that the public colleges do
not beneﬁt higher ability students diﬀerentially. We also perform a number of robustness
checks to validate these ﬁndings. Our results show that the private-public observed quality
gap reﬂects that better students sort into the less expensive colleges, rather than a causal
impact of public colleges on tertiary educational outcomes.
Our study complements the literature examining the costs and beneﬁts of public versus
a few elite private institutions of higher education, public institutions share a higher prestige than private
ones (Gupta, 2005).
4Professional colleges and a few elite private colleges usually conduct an entrance exam to select students.
However, country wide admissions into colleges for general education are governed by marks obtained in class
XII Senior Secondary School exams.
5Some examples can be found at the following URLS:
http://www.winentrance.com/Indian Institute of technology/Delhi/IIT Delhi Admissions PH D
Programmes.html,http://www.amity.edu/scholarships/, http://www.licindia.com/pages/aao
generalist ca actuarial.pdf
2private provision of public services. We make two contributions to the existing literature.6
First, we examine whether public tertiary educational institutions produce better trained
college graduates in the context of a developing country. This question is of signiﬁcant
policy relevance from public ﬁnance point of view. Second, our unique data set in which
we match college admission data to college exit scores allows us to employ a regression
discontinuity design to evaluate the value-added eﬀect of public versus private providers of a
public service. In the models of incomplete contract developed to investigate the public versus
private provision of public services, private and public providers have conﬂicting objectives.
They want to improve quality, but at the same time reduce costs. Theoretically, public
providers do not necessarily provide better service. Non-proﬁts and private providers, as
shown by Besley and Ghatak (2001)and Hart et al (1997), can outperform public providers
if their incentives to provide better quality outweigh the incentives to reduce cost. We
examine whether the quality of service provision by public providers is better in the context
of higher education in India. Our paper is the ﬁrst study to shed light on the value-added
of public versus private tertiary education institutions in a developing country setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide the institutional background in
section 2, and the theoretical framework in section 3. In Section 4, we describe the data that
we use in our analysis. Section 5 and 6 motivate and describe our empirical strategy. Section
7 provides the main results, while section 8 compares the cost of education at public and
private colleges. We describe the results of our robustness checks in section 9. We conclude
by discussing policy implications in section 10.
2 Institutional background
India’s Economy and Growth of Higher Education
India has experienced tremendous growth in recent years, which has been attributed to its
vast pool of highly educated workers. In 2003, the service sector contributed approximately
47 percent of the GDP, followed by the industrial sector’s contribution of 24 percent. This
is in stark contrast to only a half century earlier, as Indian economy was largely agricultural
as recently as 1950. Tertiary education especially technology-oriented training, feeds the
current boom of business process out-sourcing to India.7 The high rate of growth in the
6Section 3 provides a brief review.
7The Indian experience of growth enhancing tertiary education supports recent research that explores the
relationship between tertiary education and growth. In cross country regressions, Barro (1999) ﬁnds that
tertiary educational attainment has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the subsequent rate of a country’s
economic growth. Policy reports on productivity and growth diﬀerence between Europe and the USA argue
that under investment in higher education is responsible for slow growth in Europe (Sapir, 2003). Aghion
3service sector has had a feedback eﬀect on demand for tertiary education. While the number
of colleges has steadily increased since India’s independence in 1947, it was only in the 1990s
that the number of colleges saw a dramatic rise.8 9 The enrollment ﬁgures also show a similar
trend. General education college enrollment spurted in the post-reform decades. Although
the demand for higher education is on the rise, only 7-9 percent of the college-age population
enrolls in tertiary education institutions.
Overview of Public and Private Institutions of Tertiary Education in India
While there are no formal private universities in India in the general education sector, there
are a large number of private colleges oﬀering general and technical education.10 Private
colleges are managed privately, and may receive public funds (“private aided college”) or
may be totally self ﬁnanced (“private unaided college”). The private aided colleges receive
public funds to meet their recurring expenditures (mostly teacher salaries) and charge much
higher tuition than the government colleges. Public colleges are managed and ﬁnanced by
the government. Public colleges cannot accept any private donations and the state funds
their maintenance and development expenses. The private aided colleges can raise funds
by charging higher fees and accepting donations from philanthropic or business groups.
Public colleges are managed and run by state employees. The un-aided private colleges
started emerging only in the post-reform era and there has been a remarkable increase in
their number, especially in the professional education sphere.11 About three fourths of the
total colleges in India are private colleges(UNESCO, 1998). Web Appendix Figure A.2
shows the share of government and private sector in junior colleges and higher secondary
schools in 2003-04. About 64 percent of these institutions were privately managed, and 35
percent were run by the government. Since Independence, the government of India has put
et al. (2005) explore the causal impact of higher education on growth and ﬁnd that tertiary education does
aﬀect growth, but the magnitude of the eﬀect depends on the distance of the country from the technology
frontier.
8The higher education system in India grew rapidly after Independence. By 1980, there were 132 uni-
versities and 4738 colleges in the country enrolling around ﬁve per cent of the eligible age group in higher
education. The pace of growth in number of institutions accelerated after the economic reforms that com-
menced in 1991. Today, India is the third largest higher education system in the world in terms of enrollment
(after China and the USA), and it is the largest higher education system in the world in terms of number of
institutions. The number of institutions of higher education in India is more than four times the combined
number of institutions both in the United States and all of Europe (Agarwal, 2006).
9Web Appendix Figure A.I (based on data collected by the University Grants Commission, India) high-
lights the increase in the number of colleges in India between 1950 and 2001 and depicts this pattern clearly.
10Although these colleges are a private initiative, they are not recognized as “for- proﬁt businesses”.
11Nasscom (The National Association of Software Companies) reports that out of 139 engineering colleges
in 1970, 4 were private; whereas in 2006, 1400 out of the 1600 engineering colleges were private. The
enrollment in unaided private colleges was estimated to be about 30 percent of the total cohort of enrolling
students in 2006 (Agarwal, 2006).
4considerable emphasis on equitable access to higher education as an important policy goal
and has subsidized higher education accordingly. To implement this subsidy, government
colleges charge only a nominal fee for attending such institutions. Among the colleges in our
sample (in 2005), private institutions charged about 5-6 times more than the public colleges
in tuition. The admission to public colleges is strictly based on merit. However, beneﬁciaries
of aﬃrmative action also attend public colleges under a system of reservation of seats for
marginalized groups i.e., scheduled castes. The merit criterion used for these groups tends
to diﬀer than the one used for general category non-reserved seats.
Regulations in India’s Tertiary Education
Tertiary education sector in India is highly regulated. The University Grant Commission
Act (UGC), which is the government body that regulates tertiary education, has a provision
that prohibits any institution from awarding degrees unless it is established under an act of
Parliament or is specially empowered to award degrees. The UGC allocates central grants
to various universities based on their requirements and needs (Department of Secondary and
Higher Education, Government of India). An important feature of the education system is
that the power to grant degrees is vested with the universities. Independent colleges are
not allowed to confer a degree on their own accord.12 These colleges have to aﬃliate with
a university in order to operate. As a result, all students in colleges (private or public)
aﬃliated with the same university, take the same exit exams. These exams vary by ﬁeld of
study, but conditional on the ﬁeld, private and public college students are exposed to the
same curriculum and take the same exam. The examinations for the aﬃliated colleges are
conducted by the respective universities, which also set the course curriculum. The aﬃliated
colleges only oﬀer prescribed courses of study.13 The universities across the country also
coordinate on developing the curriculum, assessing performance, determining fee structures,
and establishing norms for teacher qualiﬁcations in an attempt to homogenize tertiary ed-
ucation so that it is more equitable. There is a national-level eligibility test to qualify to
teach in the tertiary educational institutions.
12The colleges account for about nine-tenths of undergraduate enrollments (Agarwal, 2006)
13The UGC has recently conducted an experiment of conferring autonomous status on selected colleges
enabling these colleges to prescribe courses, determine the curriculum content, and decide learning methods.
The colleges continue to remain aﬃliated with the universities who approve the courses, hold exams, and
award degrees.
53 Theoretical Framework
There is considerable debate about when government should provide services and institutions
such as prisons, hospitals, ﬁre departments, and educational institutions and when should
these be contracted out to private providers. Economists have addressed this issue both
theoretically and empirically. Advocates of private provision point out that the private
providers deliver public goods at a lower cost than the government. Also, there are agency
problems and incentive design issues. The public employees have little at stake in the service
provision and hence do not exert any eﬀort to deliver quality service. Additionally, a lack of
accountability results from unconditional job security, and non merit criterion like seniority
for promotion of public employees. For example, in a recent survey of health care facilities
in rural India, Bannerjee et al (2004) found signiﬁcant absenteeism among the staﬀ of the
public health care facilities. These facilities were also found to be closed erratically. In
contrast, critics stress that private providers would cut quality to achieve lower costs, and
hence the quality of public services provided by private suppliers would be inferior to those
provided by public employees.
Theoretically, the choice of contracting services out versus providing them in-house has
been investigated in the framework of incomplete contracts. Hart et al (1997) developed
a framework to demonstrate that private providers under certain circumstances can deliver
higher quality services than the public employees.In the same vein, Besley and Ghatak (2001)
show that if contracts are incomplete, then contracting out to non-proﬁts can be preferred
especially for social goods that non-proﬁts value. In case of tertiary education, this choice
is not clear ex ante. Since students choose which institution to attend, private colleges
have a strong incentive to provide higher quality education in order to compete. At the
same time, unless the education is paid for by the government, as is the case in voucher
arrangements in schools, the private colleges would also have an incentive to reduce costs.
As a result, if incentives to reduce costs outweigh quality improvement, then the quality of
provision can be undermined. Thus, the public employees whose incentives are more aligned
with the government might provide better service. To our knowledge, no empirical study
addresses this question in the context of tertiary education.14Moreover, this issue is even
14Some studies have addressed the quality diﬀerence between private and public schools (Cox and Jimenez,
1991; Kingdon, 1996; Das, Pandey and Zajonc, 2006) and concluded that the private schools outperform
public schools. These studies make strong assumptions about selection into private schools. But surprisingly,
not much research has focused on tertiary education even though it is considered to be the engine of India’s
economic growth. Another set of studies has evaluated the eﬀectiveness of private versus public schools
by focusing on voucher schemes. Angrist et al (2002) exploit random lotteries for vouchers that enable a
student to attend a private school and compare the outcomes of winners of the lotteries to the losers. They
ﬁnd that the lottery winners do better than the losers. Lottery winners are more likely to have attended
private schools which could be better than public ones, but this could also be due to a transition of students
6more pertinent in a developing country setting where a robust tertiary education sector can
accelerate economic growth (Aghion et al, 2005), which can lead to trickle-down beneﬁts
that improve standards of living.15
In India, there is intense debate about whether government should provide tertiary educa-
tion.16 While the expansion of high quality tertiary education is essential for the continued
robust growth of the Indian economy, the existing infrastructure is not able to meet the
demand for college graduates. From a policy perspective, whether the government should
expand the public college system or contract higher education out to private providers,
remains an open question. In this paper, we attempt to address whether public colleges
operated by public employees provide better quality of services than private providers in the
context of the general college education in India.
Our ﬁndings also complement a set of studies that examine the payoﬀ of attending a
more selective college(Dale and Krueger, 2001; Behrman et al, 1996). Since the unobserved
characteristics of students might inﬂuence both college admissions and later outcomes such
as performance in college or post- college earnings, it is diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀect
of going to a more selective college from student’s pre-college characteristics. A number
of approaches including siblings ﬁxed eﬀects, and matching methods, and more recently
regression discontinuity design (Hoekstra (2009), Savendra (2009)) have been used to address
this issue. Selective colleges can inﬂuence student outcomes because of better human capital
production, or peer eﬀects. The public colleges in India however are distinct. These are
considered more prestigious, but they also reserve 25 percent of the seats for marginalized
groups who enter college based on a much lower admission cutoﬀ. Hence, these colleges are
not highly selective in the strict sense. Our study diﬀers from the other papers employing a
regression discontinuity design in the context of studying higher education along a number
of dimensions. With our data, we are able to examine the college educational outcomes of
in private schools to more expensive and better private schools. Moreover, students had incentives to exert
more eﬀort as they faced the risk of losing their vouchers if they failed a grade. Hsieh and Urquiola (2002)
also study a voucher program using ﬁxed eﬀect estimation, and conclude that higher enrollment in private
schools after the vouchers were made available does not change test scores. The ﬁxed eﬀects model has the
limitation of not being able to address sorting into private schools that may be governed by time varying
unobservables. Unlike school choice which is a parental decision, college choice reﬂects student preferences.
College type may directly eﬀect post college outcomes like labor market participation and earnings. But no
study has focussed on tertiary education.
15The issue of private versus public provision of other services in developing countries, such as drinking
water and health, has been addressed in some recent papers. Galiani et al (2005) studied the eﬀect of
privatization of water services in Argentina and found that child mortality fell by 8 % in areas that privatized.
Bloom et al (2006) studied the eﬀects of contracting out management of government health services to NGOs
in Cambodia. While targeted outcomes (like receipt of vitamins by children) improved signiﬁcantly, there is
limited evidence that the program improved self-reported health of the residents of districts where services
were managed privately.
16See Gupta (2005) for a good background on the subject.
7the students. This helps us to assess the value-added by the college. We do not focus on
the returns in the labor market in this study. In addition, students have to take the college
exit exams to graduate. Therefore, unlike other settings, there is no selection into taking the
exit tests. Also, we compare the outcomes of students barely admitted to public colleges to
those who barely miss and attend private colleges, rather than comparing the outcomes of
applicants who applied but did not get admission. Finally, it is worth noting that attending
public colleges can have positive eﬀect on post-college earnings in spite of no value-added
by colleges. This could be mediated by other mechanisms. Exploring this is an important
avenue of future research.
4 Data
Data sources
Our estimates are based on a unique data set that we assembled from admissions records and
university exam results of four general education colleges in a district in a northwestern state
in India. The admission records from two private and two public colleges for the academic
years 1998-99 to 2002-03 were obtained and were matched to the university examination
results from the ’Result Gazettes’ for the respective years.
Selection of Colleges
Typically, all the colleges in a particular district are aﬃliated with the same university.17
As a result, all the students in the district take the same exams in order to graduate from
college. We restricted our choice of sample colleges to the district headquarter. This is an
urban area with a population of over one million, according to the 2001 Census of India.
There are two public colleges and 10 private colleges in the district headquarters all aﬃliated
with the same university. The colleges are either exclusively for men or for women. Among
the two public colleges, one is for women and the other is for men. There are 7 private
colleges for women and 3 for men in the district headquarters. While all the women’s
colleges receive some degree of ﬁnancial support from the state government, 1 of the 3 men’s
colleges is an unaided private college, i.e. it receives no support from the state government.
We obtained the admission records for both the public colleges and selected one women’s
and one men’s private college within 5 kilometers of the public colleges.18 This was done to
17District is the administrative unit below the state. There are three universities that oﬀer general edu-
cation in the state and the colleges aﬃliate with a university largely based on geographical proximity to the
university.
18Within the 5 KM radius, there are 2 men’s private colleges and 3 women’s private colleges.
8ensure that transportation costs did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the choice between these colleges.
The variables reported in the admission records include date of birth, gender, medium of
instruction in senior secondary school, board of Secondary School examination 19 , marks
obtained in the senior secondary board exams, place of residence (rural or urban) , father’s
occupation, and income.20
The marks obtained in the college exit exams are reported in the university wide ‘Result
Gazette’. Each student who takes the university exam is assigned a unique roll number.
These gazettes, with results for each student listed under a roll number, are available from
the university. We obtained these for the 5 years in our sample. These were then matched
to individual student admission records in the colleges. For the purposes of our analysis,
we look at the overall composite score obtained in the college degree program, which is the
accumulated total of the scores on each of three annual exams administered to students
during their undergraduate program.
Main Micro Sample
Our main micro sample is taken from admission records of private and public colleges for
admissions years 1998 to 2002. The cutoﬀs vary by year, gender, and ﬁeld of education.
We normalized individuals’ entry scores by taking deviations from each groups’ admissions
cutoﬀs. Exit exams also vary by ﬁeld of education. Therefore, our main sample focuses
on individuals admitted and graduated in Liberal Arts, the most popular ﬁeld of study in
India. For instance, according to UGC statistics cited in Gupta (2005) about 45 percent of
all enrolled students in higher education in 2002-2003 were in Liberal Arts.21 We exclude
observations with missing entry or exit exam scores. We have 3,394 observations in the ﬁnal
sample. Web Appendix Tables A.I through A.3 summarize the data processing, report the
variables we use, and list the summary statistics respectively.
Public-Private Educational Outcomes Gap
The “eﬀect” of public colleges on educational outcomes
The graduates of the public colleges on average do far better than their private counterparts
on their college exit examinations, suggesting that public colleges do outperform private
19The Secondary School exams are administered by examination boards which can be national or regional.
20The major boards in the data include the regional School Education Board and Central Board of Sec-
ondary Education. Almost 80 % of the sample is from the regional board. Women’s public college does not
record father’s income (see appendix).
21This is also reﬂected in our data where about 63 percent of our main sample graduated from Liberal
Arts (see Web Appendix).
9colleges. This holds for both genders as well as for all ﬁelds of study by year (see Web
Appendix Table A.4). We next turn to our main sample focusing on Liberal Arts students.
Figure I sketches the college exit exams scores for men and women separately for the main
ﬁeld of study in our sample. As Figure I demonstrates, the average scores in the college exit
exams for students at public colleges are consistently higher for 9 out of 10 gender-year cells.
Between 1998 and 2002, the average exit scores of men and women graduating from a public
colleges, were 0.5 standard deviations higher than the average exit scores of their private
college counterparts. However, the exit score gap might reﬂect pre-determined diﬀerences in
the academic quality of these students rather than the reduced form impact of public college
on students’ educational achievement.
Non-random sorting into public and private colleges
Table I reports summary statistics of the pre-determined characteristics of the students by
type of school for all years, all ﬁelds of study , and both genders pooled together. This table
makes it clear that compared to students admitted to private colleges, those admitted to
public colleges (i) are more likely to attend high schools aﬃliated with the central board, (ii)
are less likely to have fathers’ working in the agricultural sector, (iii) are less likely to come
from rural areas, and (iv) have better high school educational achievements, as measured
by their Senior Secondary School exit exam scores. We ﬁnd that public college students
have better family and social backgrounds than their private college counterparts, and they
perform better on common high school cognitive achievement exams. Hence, public-private
comparisons do not provide a valid treatment-comparison setting for evaluating the impact
of public college added value on educational achievements, and that the observed gap in
exit exam scores might reﬂect other pre-determined factors rather than the value added by
public colleges.
5 Using Senior Secondary School Exit Test Scores and the
Admission Rule in a Regression Discontinuity Design
Admission to Public Colleges
Admission to all public colleges in the general education sector, namely all ﬁelds of education
except professional colleges such as those dedicated to medicine, is solely determined on the
basis of the results of the Senior Secondary School examinations taken in class XII.22 All
high schools in India must be aﬃliated either with the national board (Central Board of
22Class XII is equivalent to a high school grade 12, the last year of high school.
10Secondary Education) or with their state’s regional board. The exit exams are conducted
by school boards across India and are recognized nationally. Students cannot be admitted
to college without at least passing this exam, but in order to be admitted to public colleges,
their score needs to exceed a speciﬁed cutoﬀ. This admission cutoﬀ for public colleges is
determined every year and varies by state, gender, and area of study. It also varies by caste
as part of the aﬃrmative action policy. Students who score above the cutoﬀ are eligible
for admission to public colleges. While a list of students who are invited to take admission
in public colleges is announced (posted by colleges), the admission cutoﬀs are unknown to
the public. To account for diﬀerences in Senior Secondary School exams (high school exit
exams) across aﬃliating boards, the college admission committees implicitly standardize
exam scores of applicants from other boards than the regional ones. The formulae for
standardizing and determining the admission cutoﬀ are not public knowledge. Obviously
these rules are conﬁdential information even ex-post. We obtained both the college admission
records and the information about admission cut-oﬀ scores from the colleges. The admission
process provides a “natural discontinuity” in the sorting of students into public and private
colleges by high school exit exams that can be used to evaluate the causal impact of public
college education on schooling outcomes, at least at the margin of entry. To take advantage
of this “natural discontinuity”, we assembled a unique data set that combines micro-level
data including (i) Senior Secondary School exit scores, (ii) familial and social demographic
characteristics, (iii) college exit exam scores with the admission cutoﬀs by ﬁeld of study,
gender, and year. Employed with these data, we aim to evaluate the causal impact of public
colleges on educational achievements, as measured by college exit exam using a Regression
Discontinuity Design (hereafter RDD). Public colleges might not follow the formal rules.
Admission to public colleges might reﬂect networks and family connections rather than
educational achievements as measured by high school exit exams. Eligible students might
choose not to attend public colleges. For these reasons, we perform a number of robustness
checks to examine the validity of the RDD in this particular context. In the next section we
formalize our identiﬁcation strategy and brieﬂy discuss its practical implications.
6 Estimation of the Causal Eﬀect of Public Colleges on
Students’ Scholarly Achievements
Let Yi denote a student i’s college exist score. Let Pi be a binary variable that is equal to 1 if
the i is student is enrolled in a public college and zero otherwise. For the sake of simplicity,
let us assume that outcomes can be approximated by the following linear form:
11Yi = X
0
iβ + γPi + Ui, (1)
where X is a set of other observed variables assumed to aﬀect exist scores, and γ is
the average impact of public colleges on the students’ exit scores. The disturbance term
Ui represents unobservable factors inﬂuencing outcomes. We want to estimate the eﬀect of
attending public colleges on the college educational outcome. We want to isolate γ, which
is the treatment eﬀect of attending public colleges in our speciﬁcation.
The OLS estimates of γ would be biased due to omitted student’s characteristics like
innate ability that may inﬂuence both admission into public colleges, and the educational
outcomes in exit exams. To avoid the pitfalls associated with omitted student characteristics,
we make use of the fact that the admission into public colleges is a deterministic function of
the class XII Senior Secondary School examinations (high school equivalent) test scores (S),
and estimate γ in a Regression Discontinuity Design framework.
The identiﬁcation approach we take in this paper exploits the fact that the treatment
indicator of interest attending a public college - is determined by a known discontinuous
function of an observed covariate - Senior Secondary School exit test scores. The conditional
expectation of college test scores given college type is interpreted as reﬂecting the causal
eﬀect of switching from private to public college that is induced by changes in Senior Sec-
ondary School exit test scores at the margin of admission. This interpretation is plausible
because the admission function is known to share this pattern, while it seems likely that any
other mechanism linking enrollment and test scores will be much smoother. By estimating
Equation (1) among students very close to threshold - where there is a discrete change in
college type - we can avoid the pitfalls associated with omitted student characteristics.
The students whose Senior Secondary School marks are below a distinct threshold
 ¯ S

are not eligible for admission into the public colleges. Let Ti be a binary variable with Ti = 1
indicating that the student i was admitted to a public college and 0 otherwise. Students are
admitted to public college if S > ¯ S. Therefore, Ti is expressed as:
Ti = 1
 
Si > ¯ S

, (2)
where 1(·) is an indicator function equal to one if the enclosed statement is true, and
 ¯ S

is the threshold for admission into the public college. In this set-up we are considering that
students are not randomly assigned to private and public schools, which means that is not
independent of the treatment state. Further, the disturbance term U is a combination of
the unobserved factors associated with individual’s pre-determined abilities (captured by
the class XII Senior Secondary School exam scores Si), and mean zero person-speciﬁc i.i.d
12shocks (εi):
Ui = θ(Si) + εi (3)
where θ(Si) is an unknown (to the econometrician) function of S. Hence, while we
do observe S, θ(Si) is unobserved by the econometrician. Although OLS estimates of (1)
do not have a causal interpretation, a quasi-experimental Regression-Discontinuity Design
(Cook and Campbell 1979) estimates still might.
The key identiﬁcation assumption that underlies the Regression Discontinuity strategy
is that θ(Si) is a smooth (continuous) function which, at least at the margin of θ(Si),
where T switches from 0 to 1, can be approximated by a ﬂexible function of S. The causal
interpretation of RDD estimates depends on whether it is reasonable to assume that, after
accounting for the direct impact of S using a smooth function g(S), the diﬀerential beneﬁts
from public college are the only source of discontinuity in outcomes around the cutoﬀ.
If all the students admitted to a public college attend public college rather than a private
one, then Ti = Pi, and a sharp RDD would arise. In that case, the mean impact in a




iβ + γTi + g(Si) + εi (4)
However, if a few students who are admitted to public colleges choose to attend private
colleges instead, then we will not have perfect assignment. The usual approach for dealing
with miss-assignment involves a simple form of instrumental variables analysis where the
index Ti becomes an instrumental variable for attending public college rather than a switching
treatment indicator. This is the “fuzzy” Regression discontinuity design (hereafter FRD).23
Despite the 2 stage design, the FRD provides a consistent estimator for the Local Average
Treatment Eﬀect.
In the absence of perfect assignment, let’s assume that sorting into a public college can
be approximated by the following linear, “ﬁrst stage” equation:
Pi = X
0
iπX + πSTi + l(Si) + ηi (5)
where l(Si) can be described as an n-order polynomials and Ti serves as an instrument
for Pi and is the ﬁrst stage reduced form eﬀect of Ti on Pi . The FRD reduced form equation
23The “fuzzy” RD research design leads naturally to a 2SLS strategy which has been previously employed
among others, by Angrist and Lavy (1999), Van Der Klaauw (2002), and Chay and Greenstone (2005).
13is obtained by substituting (5) into (1):
Yi = X
0
iα + πYTi + g(Si) + Ui (6)
where the FRD estimator is: b γFRD =
c πY
c πS
Estimating γ based on the regression function (1) by TSLS method, with the indicator
Ti = 1(Si ≥ S) as the excluded instrument, and Xi and g(Si) as a set of exogenous variables
is identical in approach.
7 Results
Before we turn to the regression analysis, we provide prima facie evidence of our main
ﬁndings. Figure II sketches the averages of the college exit exam scores by the normalized
Senior Secondary School scores in 4-percentage point windows. Two main facts emerge: (i)
public college students perform better on exit exams than their private college counterparts
and (ii) there is no diﬀerence between the mean and dispersion of exit scores at the cutoﬀ
margin. The ﬁrst glance at the data (Table I) indicates that students attending public
colleges come from more aﬄuent family backgrounds than their private college counterparts
and perform better on Senior Secondary School and college exit exams. Table II reports
the public-private exit score gaps, controlling for socio-demographic indicators such as age,
fathers’ occupations, place of residence and board of education. The ﬁrst entry in Column
(i) reports the average crude public-private exit score gap. Public college students score on
average about 80 points more than their private college counterparts, which is about 0.5 of
a standard deviation. Females perform better on entry/exit exams than male students, and
the fraction of females among those who graduate from private colleges is higher. To account
for the gender gap in test scores, we next control for gender and other socio-demographic
characteristics in Column (ii). Columns (iii-a) and (iii-b) report the regression coeﬃcients on
public college indicator variable for the entire sample controlling for a rich set of demographic
characteristics and socio-economic variables. Columns (iii-a) and (iii-b) report the results
separately by gender. As columns (ii) through (iii) indicate the public-private crude score
gap cannot be explained by students’ socio-economic and demographic characteristics. We
ﬁnd the adjusted gaps to be persistently higher and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level.
14Accounting for Selection on Senior Secondary School Achievement - Selection
on “Unobservables”
Tables III through Table VI report our main ﬁndings. We ﬁnd that (i) public college students
have higher exit test scores than their private college counterparts, but it solely reﬂects
the diﬀerence in entry test scores; (ii) attending public college does not have any positive
impact on educational achievement, as measured by the exit test scores. The results from the
estimation of (1) are reported in Table III. In our benchmark regressions reported in Column
(i) of Panel A, attending public college seems to improve the college exit exam outcomes
by around 124.1 points, which is about 0.75 of a standard deviation. These estimates are
signiﬁcant at a 1 percent level, and suggest that public college students perform better on
average than the private college students. Our next step is to control for selection into
treatment by including class XII Senior Secondary School examination outcomes in the
regressions. The admissions cut-oﬀ, as noted, is based on these outcomes. Panel B of Table
III shows the results when the class XII (Senior Secondary School examination) outcomes
are added to the regressions.24 Accounting for entry scores, we ﬁnd the mean outcomes of
public and private schools to be statistically indistinguishable (Columns (i)-(iii)). So far we
have limited our sample to the main ﬁeld of education chosen by more than one half of our
sample. The college exit exam outcomes vary by ﬁeld. As a robustness check, we re-estimate
all our speciﬁcations from Table III pooling all the ﬁelds accounting for ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects.
Results are reported in Web Appendix Table A.5. We ﬁnd that the public-private gaps are
robust to the ﬁeld of education. One natural concern is that students who are further from
the admission cutoﬀs in either direction are not similar in their abilities. To address this,
we carry out the analysis in a regression discontinuity framework. The results from this
framework are consistently local around the cut-oﬀs. We narrow the window around the
admission cutoﬀs and re-estimate the eﬀect of public colleges on college exit exam outcomes.
Estimates are reported in Tables IV and V. Panel (i) of Table IV restricts the interval to 12
percentage points of normalized Secondary School Exam scores (class Xii) around the cutoﬀ.
Panel (ii) restricts the interval to 8 points around the cutoﬀ, Panel (iii) to 4 points, and
ﬁnally Panel (iv) to a 1 point window. As we shrink the interval, the exit scores of students
graduating from public and private schools turn out to be statistically indistinguishable. This
is suggestive that perhaps the public-private exit score gap is explained by pre-determined
diﬀerences in students’ characteristics rather than the causal impact of public colleges. In
Table V, the corresponding panels with intervals of 12, 8, 4 and 1 points around the cutoﬀ,
24We have used a linear speciﬁcation for the control function i.e. we have included class XII Senior
Secondary School exam outcomes in the regressions. Including higher-order polynomials yields similar qual-
itative results.
15conﬁrm that there is no public college eﬀect when we compare the students close to the
admission cutoﬀ after correcting for selection by controlling for class XII Senior Secondary
Exam outcomes. These results indicate that the private-public observed quality gap reﬂects
the sorting of better students into less expensive but more selective colleges, rather than
the causal impact of public college value added on educational outcomes. As noted earlier,
compliance with the assignment rules is not perfect. To allay concerns about non-compliance,
we use a 2SLS strategy where we instrument attendance by the indicator for whether or not
the entry score is above the admission threshold. The results are reported in Table VI. The
instrument does a very good job of predicting the assignment as reported in the top Panel A.I
of table VI. The second stage estimates show an even larger public-private score gap when
we do not control for pre-determined factors (Panel A.2, Columns (i)-(iii)). Next, we repeat
this exercise controlling for the class XII Senior Secondary School exam outcomes to account
for selection. The results are reported in Panel B.I and B.2. The second stage estimates
reinforce our previous ﬁndings that the public-private college diﬀerential is on account of
selection and not value added by public colleges.
Heterogenous Eﬀect of Public College Attendance
Thus far, we have looked at the eﬀect of public college attendance on educational outcomes
pooling cutoﬀs across diﬀerent admission cohorts,and gender. Next, we examine the possi-
bility of beneﬁts of public colleges being heterogenous across the distribution of students. It
may be possible that smarter students gain more from being in public colleges. For instance
this can be on account of teachers paying closer attention to these students. We exploit
the fact that the admission varies by year of admission, gender and stream of admission.
Focussing on the main stream in the sample, we carry out the analysis restricted to various
levels of cutoﬀs.The results are reported in Table VII. Panel A reports the OLS estimates of
public college eﬀect across diﬀerent levels of cutoﬀs. As the cutoﬀ changes from highest to
lowest in columns (i)- (iv) of Panel A, the public college eﬀect seems to decline in magnitude
but is still strong and positive. Thus, the students with higher entry scores seem to gain
the most from public colleges. However, in Panel B, we control for the Class XII Senior
Secondary scores that determine assignment to public colleges. The public college eﬀect
becomes statistically indistinguishable from 0 across all the levels of cutoﬀ admission. These
ﬁndings suggest that the public colleges do not beneﬁt students with diﬀerent abilities in a
heterogenous way.
168 Are the Public Colleges More Cost Eﬀective?
We ﬁnd that the public-private quality diﬀerence is not on account of value-added by the
public colleges. However, public colleges could be more eﬃcient in terms of cost- eﬀective
provision. If this were the case, then public colleges would have an advantage over private
colleges. In order to address this, we collected cost data from the institutions in our sample
to compare the average cost-per-pupil in public versus private colleges. Since we do not have
a measure of the marginal cost of educating a student in a private or public college, and we
compare only average costs, this comparison is suggestive at best. The average cost-per-pupil
per annum in the private colleges in the year 2006-2007 was 13,022 Indian Rupees whereas
the average cost-per-pupil in the public colleges was 13,743 Indian Rupees. Although the
diﬀerence is not huge, private colleges have a lower cost-per-pupil than the public ones.
Hence, it does not seem to be the case that the public colleges are more cost-eﬀective either.
9 Robustness Checks
Do Public Colleges Follow the Cutoﬀ Rules?
We validate the use of a regression discontinuity design in this framework. We examine
whether the propensity to attend public colleges jumps from 0 to I at the admission cutoﬀ.
We normalize the class XII senior secondary school examination results as deviations from
admission cutoﬀs, which change from year to year. We look at the percentage of students in
public colleges as a function of normalized class XII (Senior Secondary School) results. Figure
III draws the fraction of students in public colleges by deviations from the admission cut-oﬀs
in 4 percents bins.25 Clearly the percentage of students attending public colleges to the left
of the cutoﬀ is almost 0. Furthermore, there is a steep jump in the percentage of students
attending public colleges at the admission cutoﬀs.26 For instance, less than 2 percents of all
college students whose high school exit score is just one bin below the cutoﬀ attend public
colleges whereas more than 95 percents of all college students whose high school exit score
is just one bin above attend public colleges. Although some who are eligible choose not to
attend public colleges and very few who did not meet the cutoﬀ attend public colleges, Figure
III clearly illustrates that admission cutoﬀ corresponds to a sharp discontinuity design.27
25Results are robust to this choice.
26This cutoﬀ is applicable only to students who apply for general admission, and is not applicable to those
who apply under aﬃrmative action policies. This exploratory analysis is shown for only one of the three
ﬁelds of study. The other ﬁelds show the same pattern.
27As detailed in Lee (2008), the continuity of the conditional expectation of the baseline character-istics
delivers the identiﬁcation of the parameter of interest.
17Do observable characteristics vary at the cutoﬀ margin?
Figures IV plots student’s age by deviations from the entry cut-oﬀ in four point intervals
of the normalized class XII Senior Secondary School examination results. We also plot
the father’s occupation and board of education in Web Appendix Figures A.3 and A.4.
While public college students are on average (i) younger, (ii) their fathers are less likely
to be working in the agricultural sector and they (iii) are more likely to take the ﬁnal
senior Secondary school exams in the National Board of Education,we ﬁnd no diﬀerences
in all these measures at the margin of the cutoﬀ scores. Further, Figure V plots the kernel
density (bandwidth 5.0) of the the Normalized Senior Secondary exam (Class XII) results
which is also smooth around the cutoﬀ. Thus, as these ﬁgures make clear, none of these
variables exhibits a “discontinuity” at the admission cutoﬀ level, indicating that a RDD
is an appropriate setting for evaluating the causal impact of public college on educational
achievements in this context.28
Do students manipulate behavior ?
The estimation strategy relies on the assumption that students in a narrow interval around
the admission cutoﬀ are indistinguishable in their unobserved (to the econometrician) char-
acteristics. If the students knew the rule that determined the cutoﬀ, they could manipulate
their behavior (for example, by trying to achieve higher scores in the Senior Secondary ex-
ams), and that would compromise the validity of the RD approach used here.29 In this case,
the sample of students’ right around the cutoﬀ may not be of comparable abilities.30 How-
ever, the admission cutoﬀ changed from year to year. Moreover, the rule that determined
the cutoﬀ was only known to the colleges internally. The students cannot control their entry
test scores perfectly as the Senior Secondary tests are evaluated in a double blind manner.
Additionally, even if they could manipulate their scores, they cannot perfectly control the
cutoﬀ. This corresponds to a case where the ‘forcing variable’ is not fully in the control of
students. Hence, we think this kind of manipulation is not a threat to the identiﬁcation.31
28As detailed in Lee(2008), the continuity of the conditional expectation of the baseline characteristics
delivers the identiﬁcation of the parameter of interest.
29It is also possible that students around the cutoﬀ, who could not get admission in public colleges, exert
more eﬀort in private colleges by way of using the rejection as a motivation. Given that a two sided test for
equality of scores strongly rejects that the mean scores for public and private colleges are diﬀerent around
the cutoﬀ (diﬀerence -0.62,signiﬁcance .953 in a -4 to +4 deviation window around the cutoﬀ), it seems less
plausible that this eﬀect would be large enough to counter the positive value added eﬀect of public colleges.
30Van der Klaauw (2002) describes the threat to the validity of the RDD if the rules that determine the
cutoﬀ are known to students in the context of ﬁnancial aid decisions by colleges in USA.
31See McCrary 2008 for details on varieties of manipulation that can cause identiﬁcation problems. In
this case, sorting into diﬀerent colleges using the Senior Secondary Scores is not in perfect control of the
students, hence in this setting, the public college impact can be identiﬁed under the regularity conditions
18Another related issue is that the students around the cutoﬀ are plausibly the stars in the
private colleges, and hence get better access to resources such as teacher time. We can check
if it is easy to discern the academic stars near the cutoﬀ, and if students try hard to be visible
in this manner. In this case, we would expect to ﬁnd disproportionately more students very
close to the cutoﬀ than away from it, approaching it from the left. We test this using the local
linear density estimator test proposed by McCrary (2008). We check if there is discontinuity
in the density of the normalized Senior Secondary School exam results in the vicinity of the
admission cutoﬀ. We create breakpoints at -5, -4,-3, and -2 percentage point deviations from
admission cutoﬀ and test if the local linear density estimator exhibits a discontinuity at any
of these values. Web Appendix Figure A.5 graphs these density estimators. We do not ﬁnd
evidence that lends credibility to this kind of behavioral change as we do not detect any
discontinuity in the density at these breakpoints.32
Attrition: Can characteristics of the students dropping-out explain the results?
While admission seems to be almost perfectly projected by entry rules, this does not prevent
selective dropout. Naturally we expect dropout rates to be higher among those who were
not admitted to public colleges because tuition is higher at the private colleges. If the
less able students are more likely to drop-out than the public-private exit score gap might
understate the causal impact of public college education on students’ performance. Web
Appendix Figure A.6 shows that those who performed better in class XII Senior Secondary
exams, are more likely to ﬁnish college education. However, there is no stark discontinuity
in this drop-out rate around the admission cutoﬀ. We also test if the students who drop
out near the cut-oﬀ in public and private colleges are diﬀerent in their Senior Secondary
exam scores, which is a proxy for their ability coming in. We estimate the probability
of drop-out separately for public and private colleges for each gender, and compare if the
Senior Secondary exam scores diﬀerentially aﬀect dropping out probabilities across public
and private colleges. In a sample including all students, we do observe that Senior Secondary
scores have a diﬀerent impact on dropping out from public relative to private colleges for
both genders (Web Appendix Table A.6). However, when we restrict the sample to students
in a -4 to +4 percentage point deviations window from the cutoﬀ, the Senior Secondary
scores do not diﬀerentially eﬀect the probability of dropping out in public versus private
colleges (Web Appendix Table A. 7). The students who drop-out from private colleges are
very similar in ability to students who drop out from public colleges in the proximity of the
proposed by Lee (2008).
32This test is not a necessary or suﬃcient condition to rule out such behavior but only provides suggestive
evidence that this phenomenon is less likely to take place.
19admissions cut-oﬀ.
Attrition: Could the characteristics of the rejected applicants explain the
results?
Another related concern could be selective enrollment decisions. If student’s from relatively
poor backgrounds decide not to attend college unless they are admitted to public colleges,
then this can attenuate the impact of attending public colleges. While we do not observe
students who did not enroll, evidence suggests that this might not be a major concern, at
least at the margin of admission. The private colleges oﬀer a limited number of need-based
scholarships to those students whose performance in the class XII Senior Secondary School
exams is outstanding. Personal correspondence with senior management personnel in the
private colleges revealed that if a student at the margin is willing to pursue college education
but cannot aﬀord it, he or she is usually able to avail a need based scholarship oﬀered by the
private colleges. According to the details provided by 1 private college in our sample for year
2006-2007, 21 students were oﬀered a 100 percent fee waiver,10 students were oﬀered a 75
percent fee concession, and 2 students received a 50 percent fee concession. In a pilot survey
that we conducted recently, student choices reveal that the private colleges in our sample
are top ranked choices among private colleges. Therefore, the brightest students who did
not make it to public colleges would most likely choose these colleges. Also, there are more
private colleges in the district than public colleges which oﬀer such scholarships and attract
students with slightly lower Class XII scores than the best ones. This might be one of the
reasons that explain why the dropout rate is smooth and continuous around the admission
cutoﬀ. Moreover, we see from Web Appendix Table A. 7 that right around the admission
cutoﬀ, the characteristics of those who drop out from public colleges are similar to those who
drop out from private colleges. Hence, it seems less likely that we will be missing students
with diﬀerent characteristics. If students with parents in low paying occupations did not
enroll for example, then we should expect the parents of the students in private colleges
right around the cutoﬀ to be in high paying occupations. We have ruled out this possibility
by showing that a number of students background characteristics are very smooth around
the cutoﬀ (Figure V, Web Appendix Figure A4 and A5).
In addition, very few individuals migrate to pursue higher education in the general sector.
Web Appendix Table A.8 shows the reported reasons of migration by migrants in the 2001
Population Census of India. Only 3 percent report migrating for pursuing education and
this includes those who migrate to pursue technical and professional education as well. 33
33Most of the migration in the age category 18-25 is reported by women on account of marriage.
20Hence, we think that at least at the margin of admission, selective attrition is not biasing
down our estimates.
Could diﬀerential peer eﬀects explain the test score gap ?
The class composition in public colleges is a mix of general category students, and students
from marginalized groups who enter public colleges because of the state reservation policy and
their entry scores are much lower than the entry scores of students entering public colleges in
open seats. One concern might be that the scores of the students on the margin of selection
in public colleges are negatively inﬂuenced by this ‘peer eﬀect’34 which could attenuate the
positive value added by public colleges. However, the students in private colleges who are
close to the margin of admission experience plausibly similar peer eﬀects. We examine this
graphically by plotting the density of Class XII Senior Secondary exam Scores that determine
entry into public colleges for various categories of students. In panel A of the Web Appendix
Figure A.7, we show the density plots for Class XII scores of (i) the students graduating
from public colleges who enter on a caste based reservation seat, (ii) and the students from
private colleges. In panel B, we show these plots for the students graduating from public
colleges who enter on a reserved seat35, (ii) and the students from private colleges. From
both these panels, we observe that the distribution of human capital (as approximated by
the Class XII Senior Secondary Exam scores) among low scoring peers of students close to
the admission cut-oﬀ in public colleges is no diﬀerent than those in private colleges. Hence,
it does not seem less likely that the negative ‘peer eﬀects’ are oﬀsetting the positive public
college value added eﬀect. Similarly, a negative invidious comparison eﬀect36 that lowers
the scores of students near the cutoﬀ in public colleges is less likely due to the heterogenous
composition of classes with students admitted on reserved seats and open category seats
taking the same classes. The open category students near the cutoﬀ are in the middle of the
incoming scores distribution. Although, the college drop out rate is very high, the number of
repeaters is negligible (close to .01 percent in the sample including both open and reserved
34We are considering the reduced form eﬀect of attending a public college. This could either be on account
of high value added or peer eﬀects. The colleges oﬀer a prescribed curriculum and there is no evidence
of academic tracking in the Indian education system. The class composition in public colleges is a mix of
general category students and students from marginalized groups who enter public colleges because of the
state reservation policy and the group identity of the students is unknown to others. Hence, peer eﬀects
would not necessarily have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the student outcomes. However, in our analysis we
will only address the overall eﬀect of students attending public colleges. A detailed analysis of ‘peer eﬀects’
on various margins will be oﬀered in a forthcoming study.
35Besides caste based reservation, seats are also reserved for some other categories like riot victims, see
Data appendix for details
36This eﬀect would imply that higher achieving peers depress the outcomes of lower ability students due
to lowering of morale (Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005).
21category students). Hence, peer eﬀects from those who repeat classes (as posited by Lavy
et al 2008) would not be of a discernible signiﬁcant magnitude.
10 Conclusion
Our ﬁndings indicate that selective sorting into public colleges accounts for the public-
private college exit exam score gap. Controlling for entry scores, we ﬁnd the exit scores of
the students graduating from private and public colleges to be statistically indistinguishable.
These ﬁndings indicate that the apparent value added by public colleges reﬂects selection
of the best students into the less expensive schools rather than the causal impact of public
education on students’ performance. Our ﬁndings suggest that at the margin private colleges
are a perfect substitute to public colleges in terms of training the students. We also show
that students in the diﬀerent parts of the ability distribution do not diﬀerentially beneﬁt
from attending public college. From policy perspective, the relevant margin of analysis is
the admission cutoﬀ. It is the students at this margin who are aﬀected by public ﬁnance
decisions to expand college infrastructure.
Given that excess demand for higher education is not being met by the current infrastruc-
ture, policy makers need to determine whether to expand government college infrastructure
or to adopt other policies such as more merit-cum-need based scholarships to students in
private colleges.37 Increasing public spending on expansion of government colleges warrants
a cost-beneﬁt analysis around the cut-oﬀ of admissions. An expansion of government in-
stitutions would lower the cut-oﬀ for admission, providing free education to those who are
otherwise willing to pay for college admission. In return, if the quality of education that these
students received was higher, then a stronger case could be made to expand public tertiary
education and incur the loss of revenue. However, our results indicate that expanding public
education will not yield better trained graduates. Unless the public colleges serve other
objectives, serious consideration should be given to allowing the private sector to expand.
An alternative policy could be to devise scholarship programs for private colleges that
expand ﬁnancial aid to the students who cannot aﬀord a college education. The average
cost-per-pupil provides suggestive evidence that the private colleges are cheaper (to conﬁrm
that at the margin of selection, we would require information on marginal costs which we
do not have). If the share of wealthy students who would attend private colleges in absence
of the public subsidy, among the students who actually receive scholarships is not too large,
37A recent article in New Yorker reports that the salaries for skilled workers might rise by about 14
percent indicating an excess demand for skilled workers. Another article in The Economist points out that
the central government is planning to open 30 new centrally run institutions to meet the excess demand for
higher education.
22then a modest diﬀerence in costs can make this policy more appealing.38Recent research has
shown that merit scholarships can have positive externalities, and improve the test scores for
those students who are less likely to win these scholarships(Kremer et al , 2009).In addition,
these scholarships provide strong incentives to the likely winners to increase their studying
eﬀort, which in turn may lead to better outcomes. When these alternate policies are feasible,
the state can extend its role in monitoring the standards of education oﬀered by the colleges,
and encouraging the development of a market based tertiary education sector.
Our paper examines how public colleges aﬀect quality of human capital acquired in col-
leges. As indicated by a large body of literature,there can be signiﬁcant returns in the labor
markets from attending selective and prestigious institutions. These can be on account of
value added by the colleges, or on account of screening by the employers when there is infor-
mation asymmetry about ability of the employees. Analyzing whether there are signiﬁcant
positive returns to attending public colleges in labor market and if so,what explains them is
an important avenue of future research. In a pilot study that we have conducted, we ﬁnd
suggestive evidence that there is a positive wage diﬀerential in public and private college
graduates in margins close to the admission cutoﬀs. In future work, we intend to expand our
survey and provide a systematic framework for the analysis of these preliminary ﬁndings.
38Let C1 be the MC of educating a student in a public college and C0 be the MC of educating the student
in the private college at the cutoﬀ for admission. Suppose P is the fraction of additional students who receive
the scholarship instead of attending public colleges.Then the beneﬁt of the scholarship program would be
(C1 −C0)P and the cost of this program will be (1−P)C1. The cost results from the use of this subsidy by
some students who aﬀord private college fee and would have paid it in absence of the subsidy. Therefore, if
1 − C0
C1 > 1
P − 1, then this policy would be cost eﬀective.
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27Table I:  Summary Statistics by College Type
Private Public Difference
Fraction Males 0.198 0.477
Variables
Age 17.99 17.95 0.04
(.014) (.015) (.02)
School Board in 
Class XII
Regional 0.78 0.63 0.15
(.007) (.01) (.01)
Central 0.2 0.36 -0.155
(.007) (.01) (.011)
Rural Residence 0.124 0.086 0.038
(.006) (.006) (.0094)
Father's Occupation
Agriculture 0.092 0.065 0.026
(.005) (.005) (.007)
Business 0.42 0.37 0.05
(.0087) (.01) (.013)
Government Employee 0.07 0.08 -0.008
(.004) (.005) (.007)
Labor 0.032 0.039 -0.007
(.003) (.004) (.005)
Professional 0.054 0.041 0.012
(.004) (.004) (.006)




Liberal Arts 58.55 70.07 -11.5
(.172) (.187) (.258)
Commerce 70.62 80.34 -9.72
(.268) (.211) (.38)
Science 60.98 69.2 -8.21





Liberal Arts 1378.73 1461.08 -82.35
(3.43) (4.58) (5.6)
Commerce 843.59 903.71 -60.12
(3.68) (4.02) (5.65)
Science 1274.94 1310.17 -35.22
(5.94) (9.2) (10.52)
Note: The sample is the 'Non-Reserved Graduating Sample' described in the Data Appendix
Data for all 5 years (1998-2002) are pooled in this sample.   Table II: OLS Estimates  of the Effect of Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes
            Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iii-a) (iii-b)
All Males Females
Public  College 82.34 131.3 124.14 97.96 133.14
(5.6) (5.7) (6.2) (11.7) (7.3)
Controls
Age -4.76 -26.56 -8.1 207.19
(3.07) (42.8) (54) (106.97)




Rural -29.17 -29.68 -26.7 -32.27
(7.8) (9.3) (15) (11.8)
Father's Occupation
Agriculture 7.8 -16.27 41.7
(15.3) (22.1) (21.28)
Business 10.4 -17.9 41.98
(13.1) (19) (18.4)
Professional 27 -34 58.53
(17.6) (49.2) (22)
Private Service -4.1 -27.7 27.18
(13.3) (18.4) (18.9)
Government Service -19.4 -19 6.52
(15.8) (24.5) (21.32)
Regional Class XII -30.12 -29.7 -26.48
Board (8.5) (17.2) (9.86)
Obervations 3394 2742 2612 662 1950
F 215.56 290.57 83.72 9.71 43.51
R-Squared 0.06 0.3 0.3 0.16 0.22
Notes:   Columns (i) - (iii)  report the results  from linear regressions estimating the effect of attending
public college on educational outcomes. Final marks in undergraduate degree are the composite overall
the composite overall scores of the students in liberal  arts streams. Public college is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the student attends public college. Column (ii) and (iii) control for the observable student
 characteristics including age, gender, and rural residence status. Column (iii) also controls for square of
age, father's occupation type, the board of education in class XII (Senior Secondary Board), and year of
admission (not reported). Excluded category for father's occupation is `labor'. Professional includes
 doctors,lawyers, accountants, jounalists, and professors. Columns (iii-a) and (iii-b) report the regression
 estimates by gender. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.                        Accounting for Selection : Controlling for the Class XII (Senior Secondary) Exit Exams Scores
          Table III: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes
                                 Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
Panel (A) Panel (B)
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
ALL Males Females ALL Males Females
Public  College 124.1 97.96 133.14 1.28 -1.57 1.72
(6.2) (11.7) (7.3) (8.06) (16.63) (9.44)
Class XII  Percentage 8.8 7.87 9.03
(Senior Secondary) (.409) (.97) (.45)
Obervations 2612 662 1950 2612 662 1950
F 83.72 9.71 43.51 122.93 14.56 76.53
R-Squared 0.31 0.16 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.35
Notes:    Panels (A) - (B)  report the results  from linear regressions estimating the effect of  attending public college on educational
 outcomes. Final marks in undergraduate degree are the  composite overall scores of the students in liberal arts streams.
 Public college is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student attends public college and 0 otherwise. Panel (A) shows the results
 from the benchmark regressions (also reported in Table I: Column (iii)). Panel (B) reports the results from the linear regressions
 that control for the percentage of marks scored in Class XII senior secondary exams which form the basis of  selection into Public
Colleges.  Each regression also controls for observable student characteristics including age, age squared, gender,rural residence 
 status,father's occupation,board of education in Class XII (Senior Secondary board), and  year of  admission(not reported).
 Excluded category for father's occupation is 'Labor'. Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample'  as described in the 
 Data Appendix.  The results are reported separately for Males and Females in columns (ii) and (iii) of each panel. Robust standard
 errors are reported in parentheses.                       Regression Discontinuity Design Framework
                   Table IV:The Effect of Attending Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes 
                                                Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1 23 1 23 1 23 1 23
ALL Males Females ALL Males Females ALL Males Females ALL Males Females
Public College 90.66 79.4 93 66.9 65.11 67.2 35.5 41.1 32.2 14.47 42.33 -0.34
(6.51) (12.66) (7.76) (7.38) (14.84) (8.68) (9.8) (19.69) (11.87) (19.88) (36) (26.19)
Obervations 1978 577 1401 1499 465 1034 847 279 568 308 135 173
F 73.19 6.83 19.66 62.9 5.6 10.08 43.83 2.73 4.61 16.31 0.83 1.73
R-Squared 0.34 0.13 0.15 0.3 0.14 0.1 0.4 0.11 0.09 0.41 0.08 0.12
12 points window 8 points window 4 points window 1 point window
Notes: Panels (i)-(iv) report the results  from linear regressions estimating the effect of  attending public college on educational outcomes. 
Final marks in undergraduate degree are the  composite overall scores of the students in liberal arts streams. Public College is a binary variable
 that equals 1 if the student attended public collge and 0 otherwise. Panel (i) reports the results for a sample restricted to 12 points window
 above and below the cutoff. The sample is restricted to a smaller window of 8 points around the cutoff in Panel (ii). In Panel (iii), the window 
is shrunk to 4 points above and below the cutoff and in Panel (iv),we report the results from a sample restricted to 1 point window around the
 cutoff. Each regression also controls for observable student characteristics including age, age squared,  gender, rural residence status, father's
 occupation,board of education in Class XII (Senior Secondary board),   year of  admission, and the concentration stream (not reported). 
Excluded category for father's  occupation is 'Labor'.  Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample' as described in the Data Appendix.
 Results are reported separately for Males and Females in Columns 2 and 3 of each Panel. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.Accounting for Selection in the Regression Discontinuity Design Framework
             Controlling for the Class XII (Senior Secondary) Exit Exams Scores
                          Table V: The Effect of Attending Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes
                                                       Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1 2 31 2 31 2 31 2 3
ALL Males Females ALL Males Females ALL Males Females ALL Males Females
Public College -7.14 -6.87 -10.51 -8.3 -10.7 -11.75 8.23 27.3 -5.48 7.76 38.03 -10.27
(9.93) (17.96) (11.84) (10.78) (19.84) (13.46) (13.46) (24.6) (17.9) (20.91) (39.94) (30.6)
Class XII % 10.3 9.14 10.34 10.7 11.4 10.92 7.5 4.53 10.23 7.86 6.84 13.83
(Senior (.84) (1.39) (.92) (1.14) (2.06) (1.44) (2.5) (4.87) (3.64) (7.64) (27.41) (22.01)
Secondary)
Obervations 1978 577 1401 1499 465 1034 847 279 568 308 135 173
F 85.21 9.89 28.4 67.9 7.74 13.93 41.86 2.59 4.89 16.31 0.83 1.73
R-Squared 0.4 0.2 0.22 0.4 0.12 0.16 0.43 0.12 0.11 0.41 0.08 0.12
12 points window 8 points window 4 points window 1 points window
Notes: Panels (i)-(iv) report the results  from linear regressions estimating the effect of  attending public college on educational outcomes. 
Final marks in undergraduate degree are the  composite overall scores of the students in liberal arts streams. Public College is a binary variable
 that equals 1 if the student attended public collge and 0 otherwise. Panel (i) reports the results for a sample restricted to 12 points window
 above and below the cutoff. The sample is restricted to a smaller window of 8 points around the cutoff in Panel (ii). In Panel (iii), the window 
is shrunk to 4 points above and below the cutoff and in Panel (iv),we report the results from a sample restricted to 1 point window around the
 cutoff. Each set of  regressions  control for the percentage of marks scored in Class XII Senior Secondary exams which form the basis of 
selection into Public Colleges. Each regression also controls for observable student characteristics including age, age squared,  gender,
 rural residence status, father's  occupation,board of education in Class XII (Senior Secondary board), year of  admission, and the concentration
 stream (not reported). Excluded category for father's  occupation is 'Labor'.  Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample' as 
  described in the Data Appendix. Results are reported separately for Males and Females in Columns 2 and 3 of each Panel .  Robust standard 
 errors are reported in parentheses.        Table VI :Two Stage Least Square Estimates of the Effect of Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes
                             First Stage Instrumental Variable Estimates
                                                        Dependent Variable : Indicator for Public College Attendence
Panel A.1 Panel B.1
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
ALL Males Females ALL Males Females
Indicator for Eligibility 0.89 0.93 0.856 0.827 0.85 0.805
(.008) (.018) (.001) (.013) (.03) (.015)
Class XII  Percentage No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obervations 2612 662 1950 2612 662 1950
F 986.58 215.34 682.24 930.9 203.8 641.12
R-Squared 0.84 0.812 0.82 0.84 0.81 0.82
            Second-Stage Instrumental Variable Estimates of Public College Attendence on Educational Outcomes
                                                       Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
Panel A.2 Panel B.2
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
ALL Males Females ALL Males Females
Predicted Public  College 153.56 117.59 164.92 11.76 -0.15 13.21
Attendence (6.81) (12.9) (8.11) (10.45) (22.23) (12.23)
Class XII  Percentage No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obervations 2612 662 1950 2612 662 1950
F 93.15 10.7 50.84 123.08 14.56 76.6
R-Squared 0.33 0.176 0.2545 0.415 0.24 0.35
Notes:    Panels (A) - (B)  report the two stage least square estimates of the effect of  attending public college on educational outcomes.  The top panel
 reports the first stage results from a linear regression where the indicator for eligibility is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Class XII percentage score
of the student exceeds the Public College admission cutoff . The bottom panel reports the results from the second stage. Final marks in undergraduate
 degree are the  composite overall scores of the student in the liberal arts streams. Panel (B) controls for the the precentage marks scored in Class XII
 (Senior Secondary exams) which form the basis of  selection into Public Colleges while Panel (A) doe not. Public College is an indicator variable equal
 to 1 if the student attends public college . Each set of regressions also controls for observable student characteristics including age, age squared, 
 gender, rural residence status,father's occupation,board of education in Class XII, and  year of admission (not reported). Excluded category  for father's
 occupation is 'Labor'. Sample used is  the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample' as described in the Data Appendix.  The results are reported separately
 for Males and Females in columns (ii) and (iii) of each panel. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Robustness Check: Testing for Heterogeous Effect by Distribution of Admission Cut-off Scores
TableVII: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes by Distribution of Admission Cutoff Scores
                                                         Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
Panel A Panel (B)                 Panel A Panel (B)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Cutoff Admission Highest Lowest Highest Lowest
Public  College 146.65 129.78 101.87 90 17.16 -3.8 3.08 -8.2
(15.2) (8.4) (14.8) (18.64) (19.07) (10.9) (21.11) (26.6)
Class XII  Percentage No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Senior Secondary)
Obervations 479 1471 458 204 479 1471 458 204
F 13.33 36.74 6.93 5.43 23.47 64.05 10.02 7.71
R-Squared 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.21 0.35 0.37 0.23 0.3
Notes: Panels (A) - (B)  report the results  from linear regressions estimating the effect of  attending public college on educational outcomes. Columns (i)
 to (iv) restrict  the sample to specific cutoffs that vary by year and gender. Final marks in undergraduate degree are the  composite overall scores of the 
 students in liberal arts  stream. Public college is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student attends public college and 0 otherwise. Panel (A) shows th
 results from the  regressions restricting the admission cutoffs to different values ranging from low to high. Panel (B) reports the results from the linear 
regressions that control for the percentage of marks scored in Class XII senior secondary exams which form the basis of  selection into Public Colleges. 
E h i l t l f b bl t d t h t i ti i l di d l id t f th ' ti Each regression also controls for observable student characteristics including age, age squared, rural residence stau, father's occupation, 
board of education in Class XII (Senior  Secondary board). Excluded category for father's occupation is 'Labor'. Sample used is the 'Non Reserved 
Graduating Sample'  as described in the Data Appendix. Robust Standard Errors are reported in paranthesis.       
 
Figure I : Panel  A and B show the college exit exam scores for liberal arts stream for men and women respectively. Difference between public 
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                         Figure II: Final Marks in Liberal Arts Undergraduate Degree 
                        This figure graphs the average final marks obtained in the exit exams of the undergraduate degree  
                        in liberal arts in 4 point intervals of Normalized Class XII Percentage Scores(solid line). One Std  
                        Deviation above and below the average in each interval is also graphed (dashed line). Sample used  
                        is the ‘Non Reserved Graduating sample’ as described in Data Appendix. Class XII Percentage pins  
                        down the entry score rank and has been normalized by subtracting admission cutoff from the actual  
                        score.  Discontinuity in Public Colleges Attendance 
   
Figure III: Percentage of Students in Public Colleges 
This figure graphs the percentage of students in public colleges in 4 point intervals of Normalized Class XII Percentage Scores. 
The sample used is the ‘Non-Reserved Graduating Sample’ as described in Data Appendix. Class XII percentage scores pin down the 
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Figure IV: Age Distribution of Students in Liberal Arts 
This Figure graphs the average age of students in 4 point intervals of Normalized Class XII Percentage.  
The sample used is the ‘Non Reserved Graduating Sample’ as described in the Data Appendix. Class XII 
Percentage pins down the entry score rank and has been normalized by subtracting admission cutoff from the 
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The sample used is the ‘Non Reserved Graduating Sample’ as described in the Data Appendix. Class XII 
percentage pins down the entry score rank and has been normalized by subtracting admission cutoff from the 
actual score.                      
 
 
                    Web Appendix: Supplemental Material Data Appendix: Data Collection and Formation
of Samples
We obtained the admission records for students who applied to study liberal
arts, commerce or science streams. We obtained the admission data for 15783
students. Out of these,7467 students were admitted in public colleges and 8316
were admitted in private colleges. These included 7983 women and 7796 men.
65 percent of the students took admission in humanities and social sciences, 20
percent in science and 15 percent in commerce. While these colleges have sig-
niﬁcant autonomy in determining the incoming class size for social sciences and
humanities stream, the number of seats in commerce and science are capped by
the university that these colleges are aﬃliated to. Usually the available seats
are in multiples of 70 and the decision is based on the college infrastructure and
demand for the stream.
The dropout rate is around 45% and the sample appearing for ﬁnal year
exams includes 8775 students. The dropout rate is similar across private and
public colleges. The retention rate of public colleges is 58% and that of private
colleges is 53%. Across the streams, retention rate is highest for commerce (66
percent), followed by social sciences and humanities (56 percent) and sciences
have the lowest retention rate (44 percent). The graduating students in the non
reserved category comprise our main sample used in the analysis(henceforth non
reserved graduating sample).
Twenty ﬁve percent seats in the public colleges are reserved for scheduled
classes under aﬃrmative action policy of the state. Additional reservations are
made for backward classes, children of deceased armed force personnel who die in
active duty or freedom ﬁghters, riot victims, immigrants from Kashmir which is
a disturbed area in the northern part of Indian subcontinent, teachers wards and
athletes. We exclude the admissions based on reserved seats from our sample.
We observe the result status of everyone in the graduating class. However, the
ﬁnal composite score is not reported for some students whose result is late on
account of administrative reasons. The scores of these students are notiﬁed by
the university later through college notiﬁcations. We exclude these from our
sample. In addition, we exclude cases where either the senior secondary marks
or ﬁnal composite marks are missing. We also exclude reappearing students and
students who remained absent from the ﬁnal year exams. Finally, we trim the
cases where the students failed in the ﬁnal exams as the percentage of these cases
is small and is not systematically diﬀerent across private and public colleges.
Table A.1.a summarizes these exclusions. In Table A.1.b, we show that the
number of excluded observations are not systematically diﬀerent across private
or public colleges for any category of excluded observations.




Number % of Total
All Observations --- --- 15783
1) Drop Outs 7008 44.4 8775
Excluding: 
2) Pass but missing Senior Secondary  marks 152 1.7 8623
3) Pass but missing Final composite score 25 0.28 8598
4) Late Score Notification 301 3.4 8297
5) Absent or reappear 1110 12.6 7187
6) Fail  202 2.3 6985
7) Admitted on Reserved category seat  1339 15.2 5646
7) Total main sample 6985
8) Total non reserved category main sample 5646Table A.1.b
Excluded Observations by Type of College
Pivate Public
Total 4418 4357
Excluded % of total Excluded % of total
 Pass but missing Senior Secondary  marks 120 2.7 32 0.7
 Pass but missing Final composite score 16 0.3 9 0.2
 Late Score Notification 123 2.7 178 4
 Absent or reappear 563 12.7 547 12.5
Fail 94 2.12 108 2.4Table A.2:  Observations by Variables in the Non Reserved Graduating Sample





Board in Senior Secondary 5603 99.20
Stream of Study in Senior Secondary 5646 100.00
Medium of Instruction in Senior Secondary  2761 48.90
Marks obtained in Senior Secondary  exams 5646 100.00
Rural/Urban Residence Indicator ++ 4586 81.20
Father's Occupation 5009 88.70
Father's Income @ 3496 62.00
Admission Year 5646 100.00
Final composite Marks in University Exams 5646 100.00
Result Status 5646 100.00
Stream of study in College 5646 100.00
++ Rural/Urban indicator was not reported for 1998-99
@ Women Public College does not record father's incomeTable A.3: Summary Statistics 
Proportion Mean Std. Dev.
Gender 
Male 0.313 --- ---
Residence Indicator
Rural 0.11 --- ---
Father's Occupation
Agriculture 0.089 --- ---
Business 0.437 --- ---
Govt. Employee 0.083 --- ---
Labor 0.038 --- ---
Professional 0.053
Service 0.297 --- ---
Senior Secondary
Board 
PSEB 0.72 --- ---
Percentage Marks
Arts --- 63.42 9.4
Commerce --- 74.34 7.95
Science --- 64.4 8.41
Age --- 17.97 0.809
Final Composite Marks
Liberal Arts --- 1413 166.46
Commerce --- 899.62 99.7
Science --- 1289.6 168.6Table A.4 Differences in Outcomes of Public and Private College Students
  General Category open seats
2002 2001 2000
Public Private Difference Public Private Difference Public Private Difference
Men
Arts 1388.18 1282.1 106.04*** 1301.5 1212.1 89.28*** 1348.45 1237.4 111.01***
13.99 14.88 13.35 16.63 10.3 14.08
Commerce 840.86 825.48 15.38 862.27 794.5 67.67*** 881.55 776.83 104.72***
13.18 10.97 8.1 9.8 11.17 11.19
Science 1342.3 1296 46.32*** 1180.2 1215 -35 1201.03 1150.8 50.28
23.9 21.65 66.64 24.2 20.69 72.16
Women
Arts 1589.19 1454.9 134.3*** 1550 1375.8 174.21*** 1554.41 1385.9 168.552***
9.89 7.52 9.68 12.3 10.6 11.01
Commerce 934.32 881.18 53.14*** 946.31 868.19 78.12*** 964.55 849.49 115.06***
14.7 10.5 10.3 9.47 10.055 11.53
Science 1578.66 1308 270.25*** 1362.2 1276.1 86.09** 1444.14 1261.5 182.66*** Science 1578.66 1308 270.25 1362.2 1276.1 86.09 1444.14 1261.5 182.66
21.5 11.4 33.5 13.69 16.1 11.4
Overall
Arts 1508.37 1424.1 84.26*** 1469.6 1348.9 120.71*** 1453.14 1361.7 91.43***
10.02 7.48 10.57 11.05 9.5
Commerce 891.3 859.16 32.14** 892.76 839.43 53.33*** 916.13 822.8 93.33***
11.56 7.76 7.45 7.46 9.67 8.84
Science 1396.15 1293.2 102.9*** 1269 1271.4 -2.45 1315.19 1257.8 57.39
22.15 10.46 22.75 13.41 17.47 11.38
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%Differences in Outcomes of Public and Private College Students
  General Category open seats
1999 1998
Public Private Difference Public Private Difference
Men
Arts 1325.86 1188 137.86*** 1248.7 1230.2 18.49
10.7 29.1 21.23 16.88
Commerce 894.02 791.42 102.6*** 864.34 806.36 57.98***
12.1 9.7 10.24 13.73
Science 1183.69 1095 88
22.2 44.4
Women
Arts 1533.32 1388.4 144.92*** 1555.3 1336.3 218.99***
10.7 7.3 9.84 16.04
Commerce 953.125 872.34 80.785*** 951.11 915.27 35.835**
13.5 7.8 10.47 12.05
Science 1355.18 1291.9 63.28** 1407.3 1250.4 156.88***
20.35 16.51 29.9 17.5
Overall
Arts 1434.23 1358.4 75.827*** 1426.8 1324.6 102.13***
9.7 8.28 13.7 14.5
Commerce 920.68 844.19 76.49*** 897.01 853.2 43.81***
9.54 6.89 8.59 10.8
Science 1280.16 1280.2 0 1292.5 1250.4 42.12
17.2 16.7 23.6 17.5
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%Robustness Check : Estimates from a sample pooling all streams of education with stream fixed effects 
Table A.5 : OLS  Estimates of the Effect of Public Colleges on Educational Outcomes
                                               Dependent Variable : Final Marks in Undergraduate Degree 
Panel (A) Panel (B)
ALL Males Females ALL Males Females
Public  College 113.71 91.67 125.58 -0.32 -6.49 6.8
(4.88) (9.53) (5.72) (6.04) (12.3) (7.02)
Class XII  Percentage 9.22 8.6 9.24
(Senior Secondary) (.33) (.74) (.367)
Obervations 4087 997 3090 4087 997 3090
F 665.79 142.91 549.53 793.6 160.75 660.81
R-Squared 0.72 0.68 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.775
Notes:    Panels (A) - (B)  report the results  from linear regressions estimating the effect of  attending public college on educational
 outcomes. Final marks in undergraduate degree are the  composite overall scores of the students in a pooled sample of all streams
 Public college is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student attends public college and 0 otherwise. Panel (A) shows the results
 from the benchmark regressions ( Table I: Column (iii) reports these for 1 stream). Panel (B) reports the results from the regressions
 that control for the percentage of marks scored in Class XII senior secondary exams which form the basis of selection into Public
 Colleges.  Each regression also controls for observable student characteristics including age, age squared, gender, rural residence
 status,father's occupation,board of education in Class XII (Senior Secondary board),   year of  admission, and the concentration
 stream (not reported). Excluded category for father's occupation is 'Labor'. Professional Includes doctors, lawyers,accountants,
 journalists, and professors. Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample' as described in the Data Appendix. Robust 
 standard errors are reported in parentheses. The results are reported separately for Males and Females in columns (ii) and (iii) 
 of each panel.   Table A.6:   Probit Estimates of Probability of Dropping out ‐Entire Sample
                    Men  Chow Test                    Women Chow Test
Public Private  Stat Significance Public Private  Stat Significance
Senior Secondary  ‐0.019 ‐0.035 3.28 0.07 0.009 ‐0.02 8.97 0.002
Score (.007) (.005) (.01) (.003)
Father's  Occupation
Government Service 0.2 0.187 0 0.94 0.2 ‐0.23 2.93 0.08
(.15) (.182) (2) (.13)
Professional 0.12 ‐0.03 0.16 0.68 0.1 ‐0.17 1.17 0.28
(.24) (.28) (.2) (.14)
Service 0.047 ‐0.006 0.12 0.72 0.3 ‐0.26 2 0.15
(.12) (.09) (.17) (.11)
Agriculture 0.21 0.23 0.02 0.88 0.23 0.009 0.75 0.38
(.13) (.10) (.2) (.12)
Business 0.1 0.02 0.19 0.66 0.1 ‐0.35 5.53 0.01
(.125) (.1) (.16) (.112)
Regional Borad ‐0.0031964 ‐0.006 0 0.98 ‐0.03 ‐0.25 2.54 0.11
(.12) (.14) (.09) (.09)
Rural 0.0001629 ‐0.000057 2.17 0.14 0.0005 0.0002 8.13 0.004
(0.00009) (.0001) (.0001) (.00005)
Age 0.132 0.09 0.83 0.36 0.09 0.14 0.54 0.46
(.03) (.03) (.06) (.02)
Observations 1757 3142 1102 3141
Notes: The first 2 columns in each panel report results from a separate probit regression of drop-out probablity  restricted to public and private 
 colleges respectively. Panel (i) reports the results for Men and (ii) for Women colleges. The results from the  test of equivalence of coefficients  
 (Chow test) are reported in next 2 columns with test statistic in the third column and significance level in the fourth coulmn. Excluded category 
 for father's occupation  is 'Labor'. Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample'  as described in the 'Data Appendix'.             Table A.7: Probit Estimates of Probability of Dropping out ‐ Sample Restricted  to ‐4 to + 4  Point Window Around 
                               Admission Cutoff
                    Men  Chow Test                    Women Chow Test
Public Private  Stat Significance Public Private  Stat Significance
Senior Secondary ‐ 0.044 ‐0.043 0 0.97 ‐0.005 0.003 0.02 0.88
Scores (.03) (.03) (.04) 0.04
Father's  Occupation
Government Service ‐0.05 ‐0.04 0 0.99 ‐0.23 ‐0.2 0 0.96
(.2) (.46) (.33) (.47)
Professional 0.56 0.64 0.01 0.91 ‐0.21 ‐0.31 0.03 0.86
(.44) (.68) (.36) (.48)
Service ‐0.28 0.18 2.72 0.1 ‐0.1 ‐0.1 0 0.97
(.17) (.22) (.25) (.45)
Agriculture ‐0.04 0.3 1.2 0.27 0.05 ‐0.57 1.18 0.27
0.188 (.25) (0.32) (.47)
Business ‐0.12 0.03 0.25 0.61 0.12 ‐0.61 2.15 0.14
(.17) (.24) (.24) (.43)
Regional Board 0.22 ‐0.0003 0.32 0.57 0.14 ‐0.4 5.13 0.02
(.25) (.3) (.15) (.17)
Rural 0.0002 ‐0.0002 2.06 0.15 0.0004 0.003 0.34 0.56
(.0001) (.0002) 0.0001 (.0001)
Age 0.12 0.1 0.03 0.86 0.02 0.24 3.53 0.06
(.05) (.07) (.08) (.07)
Observations 633 289 476 491
Notes: The first 2 columns in each panel report results from a separate probit regression of drop-out probablity  restricted to public and private 
 colleges respectively. Panel (i) reports the results for Men and (ii) for Women colleges. The results from the  test of equivalence of coefficients  
 (Chow test) are reported in next 2 columns with test statistic in the third column and significance level in the fourth coulmn. Excluded category 
 for father's occupation  is 'Labor'. Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating Sample'  as described in the 'Data Appendix'.                      Table A.8:  Reasons for Migration of Migrants by Last Residence  ‐Duration (0‐9 years) 
 Persons   Total Males Females
 Total migrants    98,301,342    32,896,986    65,404,356  
 Reason for migration:       
 Work/Employment   14.7    37.6   3.2  
 Business   1.2    2.9   0.3  
 Education   3.0    6.2   1.3  
 Marriage   43.8    2.1   64.9  
 Moved after birth   6.7    10.4   4.8  
 Moved with households   21.0    25.1   18.9  






















































































  Robustness Check: Do observables exhibit a discontinuity at the margin of selection? 
 
Figure A.3: Percentage of Students by Father’s Occupation 
This Figure graphs the percentage of students in 4 point intervals of Normalized Class XII Percentage by Father’s 
occupation. The sample used is the ‘Non Reserved Graduating Sample’ as described in the Data Appendix.  
Class XII Percentage pins down the entry score rank and has been normalized by subtracting admission cutoff from the 
actual score. In each Panel, Y Axis represents Percentage of Students with particular Father’s occupation. Normalized 
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              Robustness Check: Do observables exhibit a discontinuity at the margin of selection? 
 
   Figure A.4: Percentage of Students from National (CBSE) & Regional Class (PSEB) XII Board  
This Figure graphs the percentage of students from National (CBSE) and Regional (PSEB) Class XII Board in 4 point intervals of 
Normalized Class XII Percentage.  The Sample used is the 'Non Reserved Graduating sample' as described in Data Appendix. 
Class XII Percentage pins down the entry score rank and has been normalized by subtracting admission cutoff from the actual 
score.  
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        Figure A.5: Local Linear Density Estimator for the Class XII Senior Secondary Exam Scores (Normalized) with varying 
Breakpoints: This figure shows the local linear density estimator for the Class XII Senior Secondary Exam Scores using 4 different 
breakpoints around the cutoff. The breakpoint in Panel A is at -5 percentage point deviation from the admission cutoff, and in Panel B, 

































-40 -36 -32 -28 -24 -20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20 24















































































































 Reserved Categories in Public  Private
 
 Figure A.7:  Densities of Class XII Senior Secondary Exam Scores for students in public colleges 
entering through reservation policy compared to the students in private colleges. 